USA: Nuclear Reactor Guards Feel Vulnerable to Attack
By Cat lazaroff
Environment News Service
September 12, 2002
WASHINGTON, DC - Security guards protecting 24 of the nation's nuclear reactors, located at 13 power plants across the U.S., have little confidence that they could defeat a determined terrorist attack, finds a new report by a nonprofit nuclear watchdog group. The guards told interviewers that their morale is very low, and that they are under equipped, understaffed, and underpaid.
The report, based on interviews conducted by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), warns that security guards at only one out of four nuclear power plants are confident their plant could defeat a terrorist attack.
"If an attack took place, most of the guards would run like hell," said one of the more than 20 guards interviewed for the report. Most of these guards asked that neither they nor the utility that runs their plant be identified so as not to expose ongoing vulnerabilities, and because of the fear of reprisal from their employers.
The guards told the POGO interviewers that most nuclear power plants have increased the overtime hours worked by plant security personnel, rather than adding new personnel, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Some guards are now working up to six consecutive days of 12 hour shifts, and guards raised serious concerns about fatigue.
Prior to September 11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required only five to 10 security guards on duty per nuclear reactor. Since then, the NRC has ordered the utilities to minimally increase the guard force, but many plant operators have opted to increase the hours of their existing guards instead.
While a few guards said their plants have increased the guard force - one plant has tripled the number of guards - most interviewed believe that they are still below adequate levels to defeat a real terrorist attack.
"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's security requirements are totally inadequate to defend a nuclear power plant from terrorist attack," said Danielle Brian, executive director of POGO. "The vast majority of nuclear plants have done the least amount required to protect the American public from a suicidal terrorist attack."
Inadequate training and preparation was another concern raised by the guards interviewed by POGO. Nuclear industry executives have repeatedly claimed that guards receive 270 hours of training before being posted; 90 hours per year to requalify with their weapons; and 30 hours per year in antiterrorist tactical exercises.
None of these claims appear to be true, POGO charges. Most guards interviewed train with their weapons only once per year for two to three hours during their annual weapons qualification. Most also have had no training or practice in shooting at a moving target.
So called "tabletop" exercises, aimed at training guards to respond to theoretical attacks, are so rudimentary that utilities use red and blue colored clothes pins to depict locations and tactics of guards and terrorists.
Low wages and inadequate health, disability and other benefits are causing high turnover in the guard force - at some plants as high as 70 to 100 percent over the 3 year life of a labor contract. At six nuclear facilities identified by POGO, security guards were being paid $1 to $4 less per hour than custodians or janitors.
Guards also often earn less than workers in their area who face substantially less risk such as funeral attendants, manicurists and aerobic instructors, the report notes.
Many of the guards also believe they are not equipped with adequate weaponry. The power and range of weapons provided to many of the guards is vastly inferior to the weapons known to be used by terrorists, due in part to restrictive state laws.
According to one guard, terrorists will come armed with automatic weapons, sniper rifles and grenades and the guard force "would be seriously outgunned, and won't have a chance."
Even the weapons available to the security guards might be useless in the case of a sneak attack, as nearly all of the guards interviewed raised concerns about the lack of guidance on the use of deadly force.
Guards are currently restricted from using deadly force unless an intruder is wielding a weapon or threatening the life of an individual. For example, if a suicidal terrorist with a backpack containing explosives jumped the fence and headed straight for a spent fuel pool, the guard could legally only observe and report the event.
Spent fuel pools are temporary storage areas where depleted fuel rods from nuclear reactors are stored in water to keep them cool enough to avoid a nuclear reaction and radiation release. At nuclear plants that have boiling water reactors - about one third of existing U.S. reactors - spent fuel pools are located above ground, outside reactor containment buildings.
Because my message was too long, part two follows in the next post.